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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we study optimization problemswith verifiable one-parameter selfish agents
introduced by Auletta et al. [V. Auletta, R. De Prisco, P. Penna, P. Persiano, The power of
verification for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 31st International Colloquium
on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP, in: LNCS, vol. 3142, 2004, pp. 171–182].
Our goal is to allocate load among the agents, provided that the secret data of each agent
is a single positive real number: the cost they incur per unit load. In such a setting the
payment is given after the load completion, therefore if a positive load is assigned to an
agent, we are able to verify if the agent declared to be faster than she actually is. We
design truthful mechanisms when the agents’ type sets are upper-bounded by a finite
value. We provide a truthful mechanism that is c · (1 + )-approximate if the underlying
algorithm is c-approximate and weakly-monotone. Moreover, if type sets are also discrete,
we provide a truthful mechanism preserving the approximation ratio of its algorithmic
part. Our results improve the existing ones which provide truthful mechanisms dealing
only with finite type sets and do not preserve the approximation ratio of the underlying
algorithm. Finally, we give applications for our payment schemes. Firstly, we give a full
characterization of the Q‖Cmax problem by using our techniques. Even if our payment
schemes need upper-bounded type sets, every instance ofQ‖Cmax can be ‘‘mapped’’ into an
instance with upper-bounded type sets preserving the approximation ratio. In conclusion,
we turn our attention to binary demand games. In particular, we show that the Minimum
Radius Spanning Tree admits an exact truthful mechanismwith verification achieving time
(and space) complexity of the fastest centralized algorithm for it. This contrasts with a
recent truthful mechanism for the same problem [G. Proietti, P. Widmayer, A truthful
mechanism for the non-utilitarianminimum radius spanning tree problem, in: Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, ACM
Press, 2005, pp. 195–202] which pays a linear factor with respect to the complexity of the
fastest centralized algorithm. Such a result is extended to several binary demand games
studied in literature.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Optimization problems dealing with resource allocation are classical algorithmic problems and they have been studied
for decades in severalmodels: centralized vs. distributed algorithms, on-line vs. off-line algorithms and so on. The underlying
hypothesis has been that the input is available to the algorithm (either from the beginning in off-line algorithms or during
its execution in on-line algorithms). This assumption turns out to be unrealistic in the context of modern networks like the
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Internet. Here, the various parts of the input are owned by selfish (but rational) agents as part of their private information
(called the type) and thus the optimization algorithmwill have to ask the agents for their type and thenwork on the reported
types. In this context, it is realistic to assume that an agent will lie about her type if this leads to a solution S that she prefers,
even in spite of the fact that S is not globally optimal.
The field of mechanism design is the branch of Game Theory andMicroeconomics that studies ways of inducing, through
payments, the agents to report their true type so that the optimization problem can be solved on the actual input. In this
paper we study the design of algorithms for solving (or approximately solving) combinatorial optimization problems in
presence of selfish agents.
Following the standard notation used in the study of approximation of combinatorial optimization problems (see,
e.g., [21,2]), we consider problems defined as four-tuples (I,m, sol, goal), where I is the set of instances of the problem;
sol(I) is the set of feasible solutions of instance I; m(S, I) is the measure of the feasible solution S of instance I and goal
is either min or max. Thus, the optimization problem consists in finding a feasible solution S∗ for instance I such that
m(S∗, I) = opt(I) := goalS∈sol(I)m(S, I). A c-approximation algorithm A forΠ = (I,m, sol, goal) is such that
∀I ∈ I, max
{
m(A(I), I)
opt(I)
,
opt(I)
m(A(I), I)
}
≤ c.
In an optimization problemΠ with selfish agents, there arem agents which privately know part of the input. Thus, every
instance I ∈ I consists of two parts I = (T , σ ), where the vector T = (t1, t2, . . . , tm) is the private part of the input and σ
is the public part of the input. In particular, we assume that ti is known only to agent i, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and we call ti the
type of agent i. The type set Θi of agent i is the set of the possible types of agent i. In this setting, each agent will report some
value bi ∈ Θi (which can be different from her true type ti). An algorithm A for the optimization problem Π with selfish
agents receives as input the vector of bids B = (b1, b2, . . . , bm), instead of the true instance T it is supposed to solve. Each
selfish agent incurs somemonetary cost, costi(S, ti), depending on the feasible solution S and her private data ti. Since every
agent i is selfish, shemight declare bi 6= ti so to induce A to return a cheaper solution for agent i. Unfortunately, even though
A is c-approximating for the instance T , for B 6= T the solution returned by A on input Bmight have measure, w.r.t. the true
instance T , far-off the optimum opt(T ).
Truthfulmechanisms. In order to obtain a correct solution, algorithmA is equippedwith a payment schemeP = (P1, . . . , Pm)
in order to induce every agent to report her true type. After a solution S = A(B, σ ) is computed, each agent i is awarded
payment Pi(B, σ ). We assume that each agent i is rational in the sense that she picks her type declaration bi so to maximize
her profit.
Definition 1. LetΠ be an optimization problemwith one-parameter selfish agents and A be an algorithm forΠ , and P be a
payment scheme. The profit function profit of agent iwith respect to the pair (A, P)when B is the sequence of bids, σ is the
public information, ti is the true type of agent i, and S = A(B, σ ), is defined as follows.
profiti(B, σ , ti) := Pi(B, σ )− costi(S, ti).
It is natural to considermechanisms inwhich the profit of the i-th agent ismaximizedwhen she reports bi = ti.We have thus
the following classical notion of a truthful mechanism. In the definition of a truthful mechanism (and in the rest of the paper)
the following notation turns out to be useful. Let X = (x1, . . . , xk) be a vector. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the writing X−i denotes the
vectorX−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1 . . . , xk) and thewriting (y, X−i)denotes the vector (y, X−i) := (x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1 . . . , xk).
Definition 2. The pairM = (A, P) is a truthful mechanism for selfish agents if and only if for all σ , for all agents i, and all type
declarations B, it holds
profiti((ti, B−i), σ , ti) ≥ profiti(B, σ , ti).
In mechanisms satisfying above definition, every agent maximizes her profit when she is sincere. Thus, we assume that in
a truthful mechanism every agent always reports her type faithfully, and algorithm A always works on the true instance T .
As a consequence, we say that a truthful mechanismM = (A, P) is c-approximating for an optimization problem Π with
selfish agents, if A is a c-approximating algorithm for every instance I ofΠ . Since, in a truthful mechanism, agents are not
sure to have a positive profit, they would not participate in such a mechanism unless they were coerced. This motivates the
following definition.
Definition 3. A truthful mechanism satisfies voluntary participation condition if agents who bid truthfully never incur a net
loss, i.e. for all public information σ , for all agents i, and for all other agents’ bids B−i,
profiti((ti, B−i), σ , ti) ≥ 0.
One-parameter selfish agents.We now review the concept of optimization problem Π with one-parameter selfish agents
(as discussed in [7]). Here, each agent i has as private information a single parameter ti ∈ R. Moreover, a feasible solution S
of an instance I ofΠ defines, for each agent i, an amount wi(S) of assigned work. We call such a solution S schedule. Notice
that in the definition of one-parameter problem [7] the total amount of work to schedule can depend on the private part of
the input B. However, we restrict ourselves, as in wide part of literature, to the case in which the amount of work assigned
to all agents depends only on the public information (and not on the agent bids). We denote such an amount of load just as
W > 0. The cost function of agent i has the following special form.
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Definition 4. Let S be a feasible solution ofΠ . Then, the cost function costi(S, ti) is defined as follows.
costi(S, ti) := wi(S) · ti.
Scheduling problems for one-parameter selfish machines. Scheduling problems are typical examples of optimization
problem for one-parameter selfish agents. In a scheduling problem, the input consists of m machine speeds s =
(s1, s2, . . . , sm) and n job weights W = (w1, w2, . . . , wn). A schedule S is an assignment of jobs to machines. Let wi(S)
be the sum of the weights of the jobs assigned to machine i by schedule S. In a scheduling problem the task consists in
computing a schedule that minimizes a certain cost function associated with the schedule. For instance, in the Q ‖ Cmax
problem the cost of a schedule S is the makespan MS(S) that is the maximum completion time of the machines. Formally,
MS(S) = max1≤j≤m{wj(S)sj }. We consider the setting in which each machine i is owned by a different agent and the speed si
of machine i is the private information of agent i. To be in a setting of one-parameter selfish agents, we consider ti = 1/si as
the type of agent i. The public information σ is the sequenceW = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) of job weights. We recall that Q ‖ Cmax
problem is NP-hard.
Truthful mechanisms with verification for one-parameter selfish agents. A mechanism with verification M for one-
parameter selfish agents is a pairM = (A, P)working as follows.
1. The allocation algorithm A takes as input the sequence of bids B = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) and the public part σ and outputs
a schedule S = A(B, σ ) for the m agents. We recall that wi(S) denotes the amount of load assigned to agent i by the
schedule S computed by algorithm A on input B and σ .
2. Each agent i is observed to complete her assigned load in time Ti ≥ wi(S) · ti. Notice that agent i completes the loadwi(S)
assigned to her in time wi(S) · ti. Agent i can however delay the release of the works and thus obtain a larger observed
completion time and the mechanism has no way of detecting it. However, agent i cannot be observed to finish her load
before the actual completion time wi(S) · ti. Since wi(S) · ti is the request time for agent i to complete the load wi(S), we
denote with si = 1ti the speed of agent i.
3. Finally, after agent i releases the assignedworks, she is awarded payment computed by applying function Pi on arguments
B, σ , and the observed completion time Ti of machine i.
We stress that in this setting, payments are provided after the execution of the load and thus agents are (partially)
verifiable in the following sense. If agent i receives an amount of load greater than 0, the mechanism can find out whether
agent i has declared to be faster than she actually is (that is, bi < ti). Indeed, in this case the claimed completion timewi(S)·bi
is smaller than the actual completion time wi(S) · ti and thus we have that Ti ≥ wi(S) · ti > wi(S) · bi. Since payments are
provided after the completion of loads, the mechanism can make it inconvenient to claim faster speeds. On the other hand,
the mechanism cannot find out if an agent has declared to be slower than she actually is, since the agent can decide to delay
some of the jobs.
Henceforward we refer to Π as an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents. Let us now
instantiate the definitions of profit and truthful mechanism in this new scenario.
Definition 5. Let A be an algorithm forΠ , and P be a payment scheme. The profit function profit of agent i with respect to
the pair (A, P), when B is the sequence of bids, σ is the public information, ti is the true type of agent i, S = A(B, σ ), and Ti
is the observed completion time of agent i for the load wi(S), is defined as follows.
profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) := Pi(B, σ |Ti)− costi(S, ti).
Definition 6. Let A be an algorithm for Π , and P be a payment scheme. A pairM = (A, P) is a truthful mechanism with
verification forΠ , if for all σ , for all i, for all bid vectors B, and for all observed completion times Ti, it holds that
profiti((ti, B−i), σ , ti|wi(S) · ti) ≥ profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti)
where S = A((ti, B−i), σ ).
Note that these newdefinitions are not redundant, since in this casewehave to take into account the observed completion
time also.
Given a truthfulmechanismM = (A, P) forΠ , in [5] the authors give a necessary condition that algorithm Amust satisfy.
Definition 7 (Weakly-Monotone Algorithm). LetΠ be an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents
and A be an algorithm for Π . Algorithm A is weakly-monotone if and only if, for all σ , for all i, for all declared bid vectors B
such that wi(A(B, σ )) = 0 and for all b′i ∈ Θi with b′i > bi it holds that
wi(A((b′i, B−i), σ )) = 0.
In other words a weakly-monotone algorithm A has the following property. Fix some input (B, σ ) for which algorithm
A assigns no load to agent i. If agent i declares to be slower (that is, she declares b′i > bi) and the declared bids of the other
agents remain the same, then A assigns no load to agent i.
Lemma 8 ([5]). Let Π be an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents. If M = (A, P) is a truthful
mechanism forΠ , then A is a weakly-monotone algorithm.
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2. Previous works and our contribution
2.1. Previous works
The celebrated VCGmechanism [8,11,12,23] is the prominent technique to derive truthful mechanisms for optimization
problems. However, this technique applies only to utilitarian problems, that are problems where the objective function is
equal to the sumof the cost functions of the agent (e.g., shortest path,minimum spanning tree, etc.). In the seminal papers by
Nisan andRonen [17,16] it is pointed out that VCGmechanismsdonot completely fit in a contextwhere computational issues
play a crucial role since they assume that it is possible to compute an optimal solution of the corresponding optimization
problem (maybe a NP-hard problem). Scheduling is a classical optimization problem that is not utilitarian (since we aim
at minimizing the maximum over all machines of their completion times) and it is NP-hard. Moreover, scheduling models
important features of different allocation and routing problems in communication networks. Thus, it has been the first
problem for which non-VCG-based techniques have been introduced.
In [7], is considered the variant of the task scheduling on uniformly related machines (in short Q ‖ Cmax), where each
machine i has a speed si and the processing time of a task is given by the ratio between the weight of the task and the speed
of the machine. They characterized the class of allocation algorithms A for one-parameter problems that admit payment
scheme P for whichM = (A, P) is a truthful mechanism. Essentially, truthful mechanisms for one-parameter selfish agents
must use monotone algorithms and, in this case, the payment scheme is uniquely determined (up to an additive factor).
Intuitively, monotonicity means that increasing the speed of exactly one machine does not make the algorithm decrease
the work assigned to that machine. The result of [7] reduces the problem of designing a truthful mechanism for Q ‖ Cmax
to the algorithmic problem of designing a good algorithm which also satisfies the additional monotonicity requirement.
Efficient mechanisms for computing scheduling on related machines with small makespan (a special case of one-parameter
agents) have been provided by Archer and Tardos [7] and, subsequently by Auletta et al. [4] and by Andelman, Azar and
Sorani [1].
Mechanisms with verification. A natural generalization of the scheduling problem discussed above is scheduling on
unrelated machines (see, e.g., [17]). In such a problem one wants to design a schedule minimizing the makespan with
machines having speeds depending on the job they execute: i.e., machine i has a speed sji for executing job j. Due to the
difficulty of the problem and to lower bounds on the approximation ratio of ‘‘classical’’ mechanisms without verification
(namely, 1+ Φ is the best known lower bound on the approximation of any truthful classical mechanism [14]), Nisan and
Ronen [17] defined mechanisms with verification. In this model, mechanisms use the actual execution of the jobs to verify
agents declarations deferring payments expense to after the execution of the jobs.
Afterwards, Auletta et al. [5] have considered optimization problems for verifiable one-parameter problems. They
specialized the concept of mechanisms with verification to the case of one-parameter agent (scheduling on unrelated
machines does not involve one-parameter agents). They show that, in order to have a truthful mechanism for verifiable
one-parameter selfish agents, a necessary condition is that the used algorithmmust beweakly-monotone. Conversely, when
agents type sets are finite they have given a (frugal) payment scheme leading to truthful mechanisms with verification for
any weakly-monotone algorithm. This witnesses the power of verification for one-parameter agents. Indeed, as already
said, Archer and Tardos [7] have shown that a mechanism without verification is truthful for one-parameter agents if
and only if the algorithm is monotone. On the other hand, the authors of [5] have shown that weak-monotonicity is
necessary and sufficient for all finite type sets. Therefore, the class of algorithms that leads to truthful mechanisms with
verification is larger than the class of the algorithms part of classical truthful mechanisms. In [3], the authors have shown
as the capability of mechanisms with verification of truthfully implementing – an algorithm A is truthfully implemented
(with verification) if there exists a payment function P such that (A, P) is a truthful mechanism (with verification) – more
algorithms than classical mechanisms do actually gives non-trivial extra power to mechanisms with verification (see, for
example, the (1 + )-approximate mechanism1 for weighted sum scheduling breaking the 1.54 lower bound for classical
mechanisms [7]). Verification is also helpful in more general settings: generalization of one-parameter type sets (see [3] for
the class of comparable types), optimal mechanisms for agents bidding from any finite type set [22] and collusion-resistant
mechanisms [19].
2.2. Our contribution
In this work, we extend some results given in [5]. The authors were the first to study optimization problems for verifiable
one-parameter selfish agents. We recall that intuitively a verifiable agent is an agent that may lie in reporting its type but
the mechanism can verify whether agent i underbids (i.e. declares bi < ti), provided that the load assigned to this agent is
positive. For instance, for scheduling problems the mechanism can verify, through the observed completion time of agent i,
if she declares to be faster then she actually is, provided that at least one job has been assigned to her.
In Section 3.1, we give simple and efficient payment schemes, leading to polynomial-time truthfulmechanisms for awide
class of optimization problems with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents. In particular, we provide a payment function
1 We highlight that such a mechanism uses one of the payment schemes we are going to define.
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Table 1
Comparing results (c is the approximation of a given weakly-monotone algorithm and  is related to the
smoothness of the problem — see Definition 15).
Problem version Payments time complexity Approximation ratio
Θi finite [5] poly(|Θi|,m, n) c
Smooth problems with finiteΘi [5] poly(log1+ |Θi|,m, n) c · (1+ )
Θi upper bounded and discrete (not finite) poly(m, n) c
Smooth problems withΘi upper bounded (continuous) poly(m, n) c · (1+ )
P (1) that works for discrete and upper-bounded type sets. In this setting, we need that agents bid from sets in which there
is always a gap between the inverse of two types — in scheduling problems (where types are the inverse of machines’
speed), our assumption is satisfied when it is not possible to have machines executing j instructions per second, for every
possible j ∈ R, and this jmust be lower bounded by a finite value. Indeed, in the market there are only machines of certain
(sufficiently far apart) speeds, and infinitely slow machine does not exist. Thus, our hypothesis applies to many real-life
applications.
From a theoretical point of view, our results improve those given in [5]: (i) the class of the discrete and upper-bounded
type sets properly includes the class of finite type sets; (ii) our mechanism preserves the approximation ratio c of the
algorithm it uses, while the mechanism given in the paper [5] needs that the problem is smooth (see Definition 15) to obtain
a c · (1+)-approximation. (This assumption is required to round the input bids to get payments computable in polynomial
time.)
In Section 3.2, we give a payment scheme P (2) leading to polynomial-time truthful mechanisms with verification
(Theorem 14), for agents having real and upper-bounded type sets. In order to obtain truthful mechanism we round the
agents’ bid. Using this rounding technique, if the algorithm that mechanism uses is c-approximate, then nothing can be said
about the approximation of the same algorithm when it runs on rounded bids. However, if the problem is smooth then the
mechanism is c · (1+ )-approximate (see Theorem 17). To best of our knowledge this is the first result showing that weak
monotonicity of algorithms is a sufficient condition for the existence of truthfulmechanisms for optimization problemswith
verifiable one-parameter selfish agents with continuous type sets. It is open the casewhen type sets are not upper-bounded.
Table 1 summarizes and compares our results and those of [5].
Finally, in Section 4 we show applications our results. In Section 4.1 we study the Q ‖ Cmax problem. Such a problem
has already been studied in [5] where authors provide a frugal payment scheme for it. But, their scheme suffers from
the fact of just working on finite type sets, and it is unknown if it is possible to extend their technique to more general
domains. Therefore, we address the question of fully characterizing (i.e., for every one-parameter domain) the Q ‖ Cmax
problem by using the more expensive (with respect to the one in [5]) technique we developed. In particular, we reduce
any unbounded instance to a bounded one, obtaining a polynomial-time c · (1 + )-approximate truthful mechanism,
provided a c-approximate weakly-monotone polynomial-time algorithm. In particular, if the type sets are discrete, we
obtain a polynomial-time truthful mechanism (with verification) preserving the approximation ratio of a given weakly-
monotone polynomial-time algorithm. Moreover, we extend our technique to deal with the online version of Q ‖ Cmax
problem thus obtaining a 12 competitive truthful mechanism with verification for the online Q ‖ Cmax problem exploiting
an online weakly monotone algorithm presented in [6]. In Section 4.2 we turn our attention to binary demand games. These
are problems forwhichmonotone algorithms (in the sense of [7], see Definition 26) are equivalent toweakly-monotone ones
(for the details see also [3]). The idea is improving extant truthful mechanisms using the efficiency of our payments. This
is the case of the mechanism for the Minimum Radius Spanning Tree (MRST) (presented in [20]). For the latter we provide
a truthful mechanism with verification achieving time (and space) complexity of the fastest known centralized algorithm.
We extend this technique to several problems studied in literature by showing as our payment schemes help in obtaining
performances very close to non-strategic algorithms (i.e., classical algorithms with all the input available).
Features of our payment schemes. Both our payment schemes are bid dependent (as for payment scheme presented
in [5]). This seems to be a sufficient condition for payment functions leading to truthful mechanisms with verification.
This fact contrasts with a known result for classical truthful mechanisms (without verification) for which suitable payment
schemesmust be bid independent. In particular, payment functions P leading to classical truthfulmechanisms (A, P) depend
on the selected outcome: i.e., fixed σ and B−i, agent i declaring two different bids b, b′ in Θi, such that A((b, B−i), σ ) =
A((b′, B−i), σ ), will get the same amount of money for both declarations. The intuition here is the following: if i’s true type
is b then i can declare b′ and since in both cases the i’s cost is the same (being the selected outcome the same) the payment
in bmust be at least the payment in b′. Same reasoning holds true by considering b′ as the i’s true type. Thus, the payment
has to be the same. This can fail in the verification setting since it can happen that agent iwith true type b (respectively b′)
declaring b′ (respectively b) is caught by the verification.
Depending on the shape of the type sets, our payment schemes can become quite expensive. On the contrary, payment
schemes in [5] are frugal. But they suffer from several limitations. Firstly, they are able to implement with verification
weakly-monotone algorithms just for finite type sets. Further, for general problems, they run in polynomial time if and only
if every type set has a size polynomial in the size of the input (i.e., the m bids) (see Table 1). Polynomial-time payment
schemes of [5] work just for the subclass of smooth problems. Our payment schemes are always computable in polynomial
time and, for general problems, implement anyweakly-monotone algorithm for upper-bounded discrete type sets (the class
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of upper-bounded discrete type sets includes the class of finite domains and particular infinite domains). Moreover, for the
class of smooth problems, they are polynomial-time computable and coupled to a weakly-monotone algorithm lead to a
truthful mechanism with verification for all continuous upper-bounded type sets. Therefore, our schemes are interesting
from a theoretical point of view (see, for example, their recent applications in [3]) and represent the only general way to
obtain truthful mechanisms with verification for general one-parameter agents’ type sets.
3. Our payment schemes
In this sectionwewill define our payment schemes. In particular, we start by defining in Section 3.1 the payment scheme
for discrete and upper-bounded types. At the end of the same section it will be explained the intuition behind our schemes.
In Section 3.2 we will extend the presented idea to more interesting and natural case: real upper-bounded type sets.
3.1. A payment scheme for discrete types
Facing with a scheduling problem in real life, one is the following scenario: a set of machines of (sufficiently far apart)
given speeds and a function (of these speeds) to optimize. Looking for optimal solutions one can exclude machines that are
very slow. Thus, the following definition seems to capture the described real-life scenario.
Definition 9. A setΘi is said discrete and upper-bounded if:
• there exists a value∆i ∈ R+ such that, for all b, b¯ ∈ Θi, b 6= b¯, |b−1 − b¯−1| ≥ ∆i (discrete);
• there exists a finite value supi ∈ R+ such that supi ≥ b, ∀b ∈ Θi (upper-bounded).
In this section, we will consider only type setsΘi discrete and upper-bounded. Next, we define a payment schemewhich
allows us to construct truthful mechanisms with verification for optimization problems.
Definition 10. Let B be a bid vector, σ be the public part of the input, Ti be the observed completion time and c
(1)
i ∈ R+ be
a constant (to be given). Given an algorithm A, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, we define
P (1)i (B, σ |Ti) :=
{
W
bi
· c(1)i if wi(S) 6= 0 and Ti = wi(S) · bi;
0 otherwise,
where S = A(B, σ ).
The idea behind the payment P (1)i is to give to agent i a disincentive to declare to be slower than she actually is. On the
other hand, agent i is also discouraged to declare to be faster, if we use verification and weakly-monotone algorithms, as
shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 11. LetΠ be an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents and A be a polynomial-time weakly-
monotone algorithm forΠ . If everyΘi is upper-bounded by a finite value supi and discrete w.r.t. a known value∆i, then for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m there exists a value for the constant c(1)i such thatM = (A, P (1)) is a polynomial-time truthful mechanism with
verification forΠ . Moreover,M satisfies voluntary participation condition.
Proof. Let Sti be the schedule computed by A when takes as input (ti, B−i), and Sbi be the one on the input (bi, B−i). To
demonstrate thatM is a truthful mechanism with verification, we show that the following relation holds.
profiti((ti, B−i), σ , ti|wi(Sti) · ti)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) ≥ 0; ∀ bi ∈ Θi,∀ Ti.
For sake of readability we denote (ti, B−i) as T and wi(Sti) · ti as Ti∗.
We first consider the case wi(Sbi) = 0. From Definition 10 we have that profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = 0.
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)
= W
ti
· c(1)i − wi(Sti) · ti
≥ W
ti
· c(1)i −W · ti
≥ W ·
(
c(1)i
supi
− supi
)
≥ 0 (1)
for all the values c(1)i ≥ sup2i .
By the above calculations, we also have that profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗) ≥ 0, and thus M satisfies voluntary participation
condition. Let wi(Sbi) > 0. We distinguish two cases.
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Case 1 (bi > ti). Since A is weakly-monotone it holds that wi(Sti) > 0. If profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) < 0, from Eq. (1) we have
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) > 0
for c(1)i ≥ sup2i . Let profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) ≥ 0. Then we have:
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = W ·
(
1
ti
− 1
bi
)
· c(1)i − (wi(Sti)− wi(Sbi)) · ti
≥ W ·∆i · c(1)i −W · supi ≥ 0
for all the values c(1)i ≥ supi/∆i.
Case 2 (bi < ti). Since Ti > wi(Sbi) · bi, we have that P (1)i (B, σ |Ti) = 0 and profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) < 0. Therefore, from Eq. (1)
we have:
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) > profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗) ≥ 0
for c(1)i ≥ sup2i .
Hence, for c(1)i ≥ max{sup2i , supi∆i },M is truthful (with verification).
It is straightforward that payment scheme P (1) is computable in polynomial time. 
As argued in Section 1, if A is the algorithm used in a truthful mechanism, then it always works on true types, since every
agent always reports her true type. As a consequence, if A is c-approximate andM = (A, P) is a truthful mechanism then
M is c-approximate as well. Thus, from Theorem 11 we have the following.
Theorem 12. Let Π be an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents and A be a polynomial-time
c-approximating weakly-monotone algorithm for Π . If every Θi is upper-bounded by a finite value supi and is discrete w.r.t.
a known value∆i, then M = (A, P (1)) is a polynomial-time c-approximate truthful mechanism with verification forΠ , satisfying
voluntary participation condition.
Notice that if a type set is finite then it is discrete and finitely upper-bounded. Conversely, if a type set is discrete and
finitely upper-bounded it could contain infinite values. For instance consider the case in which for every i = 1, . . . ,m,
Θi = {i−1|i ∈ N}. This is a special case of the discrete and upper-bounded type set:∆i = 1 and supi = 1, for every type set
Θi, thus implying c
(1)
i = 1. In this case, for a given schedule S, the payment scheme P (1)i becomes simplyW · 1bi (in the case
wi(S) 6= 0 and Ti = wi(S) · bi). A different way to read this payment is to consider 1bi as the speed of agent i. Hence, to an
agent is awarded the total work to schedule times the reported speed. The novelty of the last definition is exactly that the
payment completely depends by the reported bid. Indeed, declaring to be very fast (therefore declaring a very little bid) the
payment grows up. On the other hand, latter theorem ensures that, using verification, an agent is discouraged to declare to
be faster than she actually is.
3.2. A payment scheme for real types
In this section, we show how to extend our payments in order to deal with real type sets which are only upper-bounded
by a finite value supi. To do that, we apply a rounding technique on types. Given a bid vector B, we denote with BR the vector
obtained by B by replacing each element bi with a rounded value bRi of bi. If α
γ < b−1i ≤ αγ+1, then bRi = 1/αγ+1 for some
γ ∈ Z. Thus, if B = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) then BR = (bR1, bR2, . . . , bRm). Given an algorithm A forΠ , we define algorithm Aα as the
algorithm that, on input B and σ , simply run algorithm A on input BR and σ .
Definition 13. Let B be a bid vector, σ be the public part of the input, Ti be the observed completion time and c
(2)
i ∈ R+ be
a constant (to be given). Given an algorithm A, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, we define
P (2)i (B, σ |Ti) :=
{
W
bRi
· c(2)i if wi(S) 6= 0 and Ti = wi(S) · bi;
0 otherwise,
where S = A(B, σ ).
The idea behind payment scheme P (2) is similar to the one for P (1). The difference is that we consider the rounded bid bRi
instead of the declared bid bi and the used constant c
(2)
i is essentially different from c
(1)
i . In the next theorem, we will better
clarify the meaning of constant c(2)i .
Theorem 14. LetΠ be an optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents whose types are positive real and let
A be a polynomial-time weakly-monotone algorithm for Π . If every Θi is upper-bounded by a finite value supi, then for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m there exists a value for the constant c(2)i , such thatM = (Aα, P (2)) is a polynomial-time truthful mechanism with
verification forΠ . Moreover,M satisfies voluntary participation condition.
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Proof. First note that, if A is weakly-monotone then Aα is weakly-monotone as well. Let B be a vector of bids, and Sti be the
schedule computed by algorithm Aα when takes as input (ti, B−i), and Sbi be the one on input (bi, B−i). To show thatM is
truthful with verification, we prove that
profiti((ti, B−i), σ , ti,wi(Sti) · ti)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) ≥ 0; ∀ bi ∈ Θi,∀ Ti.
For sake of readability we denote T = (ti, B−i) and Ti∗ = wi(Sti) · ti. We firstly consider the casewi(Sbi) = 0. For some γ ∈ Z,
it holds:
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗) (2)
= W
tRi
· c(2)i − wi(Sti) · ti
≥ W
tRi
· c(2)i −W ·
1
αγ
= W ·
(
αγ+1 · c(2)i −
1
αγ
)
. (3)
By simple calculations we have that Eq. (3) is greater or equal to 0 when
γ ≥ − logα c
(2)
i
2
− 1
2
. (4)
At the end of the theorem, we discuss how to choose c(2)i in orderM to be truthful (with verification). From Eq. (2), we also
have that profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗) ≥ 0, thusM satisfies voluntary participation condition.
It remains to show the case wi(Sbi) > 0. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1 (bi > ti). Since A is weakly-monotone and bRi ≥ tRi it holds that wi(Sti) > 0. W.l.o.g., we only consider the case in
which profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) ≥ 0. We first analyze the case bRi = tRi , i.e. bi and ti are rounded to the same power of α.
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = W ·
(
1
tRi
− 1
bRi
)
· c(2)i −
(
wi(Sti)− wi(Sbi)
) · ti
= W ·
(
1
tRi
− 1
tRi
)
· c(2)i −
(
wi(Sti)− wi(Sti)
) · ti = 0.
Here, we analyze the remaining case in which bRi > t
R
i . Then, for some γ ∈ Z, it holds:
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) = W ·
(
1
tRi
− 1
bRi
)
· c(2)i −
(
wi(Sti)− wi(Sbi)
) · ti
≥ W ·
(
1
tRi
− 1
bRi
)
· c(2)i −W · ti
≥ W · (αγ+1 − αγ ) · c(2)i −W · 1αγ
= W ·
(
(αγ+1 − αγ ) · c(2)i −
1
αγ
)
. (5)
By simple calculations we have that Eq. (5) is greater or equal to 0 when:
γ ≥ − logα(c
(2)
i )
2
− logα (α − 1)
2
. (6)
As in the previous case, we postpone the discussion of choosing c(2)i for the end of the theorem.
Case 2 (bi < ti). Since Ti > wi(Sbi) · bi, we have that P (2)i (B, σ |Ti) = 0 and profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) < 0, implying that
profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗)− profiti(B, σ , ti|Ti) ≥ profiti(T, σ , ti|Ti∗) ≥ 0.
Here we discuss how to choose the constant c(2)i in order to satisfy both Eqs. (4) and (6), for any value of γ . In particular, we
just show for the case in which γ = γmin, where γmin is the minimal value that γ can have. Since 1supi ≤ ( 1supi )R = αγmin ,
then by simple calculation we have γmin = dlogα 1supi e. Since logα(c
(2)
i ) can have as value any real number by varying c
(2)
i ,
we can compute a value of c(2)i such that both Eqs. (4) and (6) are satisfied when γ = γmin. Hence, it is straightforward that
payment scheme P (2) is computable in polynomial time. 
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Discussion about the rule of constant c(2)i . If in Definition 13 the constant c
(2)
i was not used, then from Eqs. (4) and (6)
we may observe that in orderM to be truthful with verification, type setsΘi must be upper-bounded by a constant which
depends on the value max {− 12 ,− logα(α−1)2 }. Thus, c(2)i allows us to deal with any type setΘi that is upper-bounded by any
constant supi.
In order to have truthful mechanism for the problem at hand, involving agents having type set upper-bounded by a finite
value, we round the bids. But what about the approximation? If A is a c-approximation algorithm, then nothing can be said
about the approximation of Aα . Next, we define a class of problems for which the loss in approximation guarantee of A due
to the rounding is bounded. Henceforth, we restrict our attention only to minimization problems. We stress that similar
arguments can be applied for maximization problems as well.
Definition 15. Fix  > 0 and δ > 1. A one-parameter minimization problem Π = (I,m, sol,min) is (δ, )-smooth if, for
any pair of instances I = (T , σ ) and I˜ = (T˜ , σ ) such that ti ≤ t˜i ≤ δ · ti for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and for all S ∈ sol(σ ), it holds
that
m(S, I) ≤ m(S, I˜) ≤ (1+ ) ·m(S, I).
For instance, observe that Q ‖ Cmax is (α, α − 1)-smooth for all α > 1. From the above definition, the following remark is
straightforward.
Remark 16. Let Π be a (δ, )-smooth one-parameter minimization problem and let I = (T , σ ) and I˜ = (T˜ , σ ) be two
instances ofΠ such that ti ≤ t˜i ≤ δ ·ti, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then, any c-approximate solution S for I is c ·(1+)-approximate
for I˜ and any c-approximate solution S˜ for I˜ is c · (1+ )-approximate for I .
From Theorem 14 and the above remark we have the next theorem.
Theorem 17. Let Π be a (α, α − 1)-smooth optimization problem for verifiable one-parameter selfish agents whose types are
positive real and let A be polynomial-time c-approximate weakly-monotone algorithm for Π . If every Θi is upper-bounded by
a finite value supi, thenM = (Aα, P (2)) is (α · c)-approximate polynomial-time truthful mechanism with verification for Π ,
satisfying voluntary participation condition.
4. Applications
Although our payments are very simple, they have the nice property of being computable in constant time (given the
reading of the input: them bids and the nweights). This efficiency turns out to be very useful in many problems studied in
literature. In particular, graph problems (andmore in general binary demand games) seem to have specific advantages from
our schemes. Indeed, in Section 4.2 we will give a specific application to the so-calledMinimum Radius Spanning Tree(MRST)
studied in [20]. Same reasoning is extended to several binary demand games studied in literature — see [13,18]).
While very efficient, our payment schemes have the limitation to require upper-bounded types. We will see that in
classical problems, such as Q ‖ Cmax, this hypothesis can be overcome. This issue (along with applications of this result) will
be discussed in Section 4.1. It turns out that our payment schemes can be easily generalized to deal with an online version
of Q ‖ Cmax problem. Following the approach in [6] we discuss this adaptation in Section 4.1.1.
4.1. Q ‖ Cmax problem
In this section we give a non-trivial application of our results to the well known Q ‖ Cmax problem. In the case in which
type sets are discrete, then given a c-approximate polynomial-time weakly-monotone algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem,
we can construct c-approximate polynomial-time truthful mechanism (with verification) for Q ‖ Cmax. On the other hand,
when we have no constraints on the type sets, then given a c-approximate polynomial-time weakly-monotone algorithm
for Q ‖ Cmax problem, we can construct c · (1 + )-approximate polynomial-time truthful mechanism with verification
for Q ‖ Cmax, for every  > 0. Moreover, our possibility results will be enforced showing a polynomial-time algorithm for
Q ‖ Cmax that is weakly-monotone (and not monotone) for all the type sets.
We refer to Section 1 for the definition of the problem. In the Q ‖ Cmax problem with verifiable one-parameter selfish
agents,2 themachines are owned by verifiable selfish agentswishing tomaximize their own profit (as discussed in Section 1)
disregarding the global makespanminimization. In particular, the job weightsW = (w1, . . . , wn), are the public part of the
input, and themachine speeds are the private part of the input, that is, each agent i privately knows the speed of hermachine.
As usual, we assume that the types of the agents are the inverse of the speed.
As shown in Theorems 11 and 14, to apply our payment schemes, type sets must be upper-bounded by a finite value.
For Q ‖ Cmax problem, since types are the inverse of the speeds, it means that the speed of every agent (the inverse of the
2 In the rest of the paper, with an abuse of notation, we will simply call Q ‖ Cmax problem the one with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents since
here we deal only with the latter.
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declared bid) has to be lower-bounded by a constant greater than 0, but this could not be the case. Therefore, here we show
a method to deal with these cases. We show that it is always possible to reduce any instance of Q ‖ Cmax to the one where
every type set is upper-bounded by a finite value preserving the optimum of the instance.
The idea is to give a lower bound on the speed (an upper bound on the declared bid) to each agent depending on the
declaration of the other agents. Thus, if an agent declares a speed value too small with respect to the other declared speeds,
then she can be discarded. More formally, let
sˆi =
{ 1
x ifΘi is upper bounded by a value x > 0
wˆ
timei
otherwise
where wˆ is a maximum weight job and timei is defined as follows. Let k(i) be a fastest machine in {1, . . . ,m}\{i} w.r.t. the
bid vector B (that is a machine with smallest bid without considering machine i), then timei is the time taken by agent k(i)
to execute all jobs according to her bid bk(i): timei = W · bk(i).
Observe that if the machine i declares bi > 1sˆi , then for any optimum solution OPT , wi(OPT ) = 0, since machine k(i)
requires less time to execute all jobs, than the time needed to machine i to complete any job.
Let A be a weakly-monotone algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem. Now, we describe a weakly-monotone algorithm A′ for
Q ‖ Cmax, which uses A as a subroutine. Algorithm A′ has the same approximation ratio of A and can be used to deal with
machines having unbounded speeds. It takes as input the bid vector B and the weight vectorW and outputs a schedule S.
1. Let Bˆ be the bids vector Bwithout themachines bidding bi > 1sˆi ; let Sˆ be the schedule returned by A executed on Bˆ andW ;
2. Let S be a schedule equal to Sˆ for all machines declaring bi < 1sˆi assigning 0 to all the other machines; return S as the
schedule.
Now, we show that this algorithm, together with our payment schemes, leads to a truthful mechanismwith verification.
Moreover, it has the same approximation ratio of algorithm A.
Lemma 18. If A is a weakly-monotone c-approximate algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem, then A′ is a weakly-monotone c-
approximate algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem.
Proof. We first show that A′ is a scheduling algorithm. Since A is a scheduling algorithm, we only have to show that at
least one machine is given as input to algorithm A. Now, we show that we never discard the fastest machines. Let i be
a fastest machine in {1, . . . ,m} and k be a fastest machine in {1, . . . ,m}\{i}. Then, obviously sk = 1bk ≤ 1bi = si. Let
T be the time needed by machine k to execute all jobs and let w be a smallest job. From the definition of sˆi, we have
sˆi = wT = wW · sk ≤ sk ≤ si. This implies that the fastest machines are surely not discarded. We now prove that A′ is
weakly-monotone. Fix a bid vector B, and suppose thatwi(A′(B,W )) = 0. We prove thatwi(A′((b′, B−i),W )) = 0, for every
b′ ≥ bi. In the case b′ > 1sˆi , trivially wi(A′((b′, B−i),W )) = 0, since machine i will be discarded. If b′i ≤ 1sˆi , then machine is
not discarded andwi(A′((b′, B−i),W )) = 0, given that algorithm A is weakly-monotone. Finally, to show that the algorithm
A′ is a c-approximate algorithm, we only prove that the deletion of the ‘‘slowest’’ machines does not modify the optimum.
More specifically, let I be the initial instance of the problem and OPT be an optimum solution for I . If bi > 1sˆi (i.e. machine i is
a discarded machine), thenwi(OPT ) = 0. In fact, the time needed by the machine i to complete the smallest jobw is greater
then the time needed to the fastest machine to complete the overall jobs. 
Algorithm A′, using the bounds sˆi, reduces any (potentially unbounded) instance I of Q ‖ Cmax to a bounded instance Iˆ of
Q ‖ Cmax. Thus, we can apply our payment schemes. By Lemma 18 and Theorem 12 we have the following.
Theorem 19. Let A be a c-approximate polynomial-timeweakly-monotone algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem. If everyΘi is discrete
w.r.t. a known value∆i, then there exists a c-approximate polynomial-time truthful mechanism with verificationM = (A′, P (1))
for Q ‖ Cmax, satisfying voluntary participation condition.
By Lemma 18, Theorem 17 and since Q ‖ Cmax problem is (1+ , )-smooth we have the following.
Theorem 20. Let A be a c-approximate polynomial-timeweakly-monotone algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax problem. Then, for any  > 0,
there exists a c·(1+)-approximate polynomial-time truthfulmechanismwith verificationM = (A′, P (2)) for Q ‖ Cmax, satisfying
voluntary participation condition.
Next,we show that a polynomial-time approximation algorithm forQ ‖ Cmax that isweakly-monotone for all the possible
type sets actually exists, so having that our possibility results are useful in practice.Wehighlight that a (1+)-approximating
weakly-monotone algorithm (for infinite type sets) has been given in [3]. Such an algorithm runs in polynomial-time only
when the number of agents is constant. We go beyond by showing a polynomial-time weakly-monotone algorithm for
the domains we are considering. In particular, we consider the following greedy algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax having a (4/3)-
approximation ratio (see [11]) that we callMkSpan3:
3 Let us recall that in [5] the authors show a PTAS for the Q ‖ Cmax . Such an algorithm is weakly-monotone for integer speeds that are upper bounded by
a constant. This implies that the type set for which their algorithm is weakly-monotone is finite. Thus, it cannot be used here to show that our mechanisms
are useful in practice for all the possible type sets.
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1. sort the jobs in non-increasing order;
2. assign, in this order, each job to the machine that completes the job in the minimum time.
Theorem 21. MkSpan is a polynomial-time weakly-monotone approximation algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax.
Proof. The proof is trivial. If an agent i does not receive any job when she declares bi, then it is obvious that she does not
receive any job if she declares b′i > bi since any job is assigned, in non-increasing order, to the machine that completes it in
the minimum time. 
Theorems 21 and 20 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 22. For any  > 0, there exists a 43 · (1 + )-approximate polynomial-time truthful mechanism with verification
M = (MkSpan, P (2)) for Q ‖ Cmax, satisfying voluntary participation condition.
If type sets are discrete, using Theorems 21 and 19, we can attain a 4/3-approximate truthful mechanism with
verification.
4.1.1. Online version of Q ‖ Cmax
In this section we study the online version of the makespan problem following the approach in [6]. In the online version
of Q ‖ Cmax, jobs arrive one-by-one andmust be scheduled upon their arrival. Moreover, jobs cannot be reallocated. For any
(possibly infinite) sequence of jobs J = J1J2 . . ., we let Jk denote the prefix J1J2 . . . Jk of the first k jobs andwe letw(Jk) denote
the weight of job Jk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ |J|. All notations used so far naturally extend in this case by including the job prefix Jk as
input (we stress that, in order to ease our notation, we do not include public information σ in this section).
Before any job appears, each agent declares her type and we denote by B = (b1, . . . , bm) the vector of declared types. An
online mechanism for Q ‖ Cmax is a pairM = (A, P) where P is a sequence of payment functions Pki , for i = 1, . . . ,m and
k > 0 such that
• The algorithm A is an online algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax: that is, A on input Jk and vector B of declared types assigns job Jk to
some machine i. We denote, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k,W j =∑jl=1w(Jl) and we setW0 = 0.• When the k-th job arrives, it is assigned by A to some machine. Basing on the observed release time of job Jk, that we
denote to as r(Jk), the mechanism awards each agent i a non-negative payment Pki (B, J
k|r(Jk)) if and only if the observed
release time is consistent with the declarations. That is, we are not allowed to ask money back from the agents. We call
payment functions with such property PayMon.
The total payment received by agent i after k jobs is Pi(B, Jk|r(Jk)) =∑kj=1 P ji (B, J j|r(Jj)), where r(Jk) = (r(J1), . . . , r(Jk)).
Definition 23 ([6]). We say that an online mechanism is truthful with verification if for any prefix Jk of J , for all B−i, and for
all types ti, the function profiti((bi, B−i), Jk, ti|r(Jk)) is maximized for bi = ti.
The problem of designing online truthful mechanisms for the Q ‖ Cmax problem has been addressed in [6] both for not
verifiable and verifiable machines. In the latter case, the authors provide an online weakly-monotone algorithm (an online
algorithm is weakly-monotone if it is weakly-monotone w.r.t. any job prefix) with competitive ratio 12. They provide a
PayMon payment scheme. The computation of their payments is possible only for finite type sets and is polynomial if and
only if every type set has a polynomial size. We thus augment their online weakly-monotone algorithm with an efficient
payment scheme.We thus obtain amore efficient 12 competitive online truthful mechanismwith verification. The payment
scheme we define is an online generalization of our payment schemes (next definition deals with integer speeds although
it is possible to generalize it through constants and rounding as we did for our offline payments).
Definition 24. Let B be a bid vector, Jk a job prefix for a given k, r(Jk) be the observed completion time of job Jk. Given an
algorithm A, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, we define
P˜ki (B, J
k|r(Jk)) :=
{
Wk−W`i(k)
bi
if Jk is assigned to i and r(Jk) = w(Jk) · bi;
0 otherwise,
where `i(k) = argmaxk′<k{A(B, Jk′) assigns job Jk′ to machine i} if k is not the first job assigned by A to machine i and 0
otherwise.
Since job weights are non-negative it is easy to see that the scheme above is PayMon. Moreover, a simple adaptation
of the proof of Theorems 11, 14 shows that payment above leads to truthful mechanisms with verification for the online
version of Q ‖ Cmax problem. We thus obtain the following result.
Theorem 25. The Q ‖ Cmax problem with verifiable machines admits an online truthful polynomial-time mechanism which is
12-competitive. The running time of this mechanism matches the one of the online weakly-monotone algorithm given in [6].
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4.2. Graph problems and binary demand games
Consider problems in which we are given a graph G = (V , E) and the set of feasible outcomes consists of a suitable set
containing certain subgraphs of G. We have one agent per edge and the type te of agent e is nothing but the weight of edge
e ∈ E. If subgraph X of G includes edge e, then agent e has a cost (for implementing this outcome) equal to te. This scenario
is common to several problems considered in the algorithmic mechanism design community: shortest-path [17], minimum
spanning tree [16], shortest-path tree [10], minimum-radius spanning tree [20]. Observe that, as already pointed out in [3],
in mechanism design graph problems, we deal with a special case of one-parameter agents in whichwe(X) = 1 if edge e is
used by X , and we(X) = 0 otherwise. Hence, an algorithm A is weakly-monotone if and only if A is monotone according to
the following definition:
Definition 26 ([7]). An algorithm A ismonotone for one-parameter agents if, for all agents e, and for all be, B−e and b′e < be,
it holds that we(A(be, B−e)) ≤ we(A(b′e, B−e)).
Recall that, as stated in [7], a mechanism for one-parameter agent (without verification) is truthful if and only if the
used algorithm is monotone. Thus, extant truthful mechanisms without verification for graph problems can be turned in
truthful mechanisms with verification (using the same algorithm) simply relaxing the model (i.e., rewarding agents after
the execution of the work). Is there any advantage? One could say: why do you relax the model if we are able to solve the
problem in a more general setting? The answer is: efficiency. Our payment schemes are very efficient and can speed up
time and space complexities of existing mechanisms as we are going to show for theMinimum Radius Spanning Tree studied
in [20].
Minimum radius spanning tree [20]. The set of feasible outcomes consists of all spanning trees over a given graph
G = (V , E). The goal is to find a rooted tree of minimum height with respect to the edge weights te, where e ∈ E. That
is, a tree Tu rooted at some u ∈ V such that the longest path from any v to the root u is as small as possible (the length
of a path is the sum of all edge weights te of edges e in that path). As observed by the authors of [20], this problem is not
utilitarian (i.e., the objective function is not the sum of the valuations4 of the agents) and some algorithms which solve this
problemexactlymaynot lead to truthfulmechanisms. The authors then provide a polynomial-time algorithmby sticking to a
particular way of computing the optimal solutions which breaks ties in a fixedmanner. Let SPTu be the algorithm computing
a shortest-path tree of G rooted at u ∈ V . The minimum-radius spanning tree can be obtained by selecting the best, over
all u ∈ V , of the solution returned by SPTu. It is very simple to show that the algorithm is monotone: when the agent
of a selected edge decreases her weight, she continues to be selected; conversely, when the agent of a non-selected edge
increases her weight then she is still non-selected). The hard core is in showing that the payments (which are completely
determined in [7]) are computable in polynomial time. Indeed, the authors of [20] show that the mechanism is computable
in O(mn
√
n + n3 log n) time and O(n2√n) space where n is the number of nodes and m denotes the number of edges of G.
Since the fastest centralized algorithm for computing anMRST requires O(mn+n2 log n) time and O(n2) space [9], it follows
they pay in terms of complexity an O(n) factor for time and an O(
√
n) factor for space, respectively. The interesting fact is
that their algorithm is computed in O(mn+ n2 log n) time and O(n2) space which are exactly the complexities of the fastest
centralized algorithm. In other words their losses in performance are completely due to the payments computation. Since
the problem involves verifiable one-parameter selfish agents and since a monotone algorithm is weakly-monotone as well
we can use our payment schemes. The next result simply follows from the results for the payment scheme P (1):
Theorem 27. If the type sets are discrete and upper-bounded then there exists a polynomial-time exact truthful mechanism with
verificationM for the non-utilitarian MRST problem. Moreover,M is computable in O(mn+ n2 log n) time and O(n2) space and
M satisfies voluntary participation.
Our mechanism uses the algorithm proposed in [20] and payment P (1). Thus, verification improves time and space
complexities of the mechanism to the ones of the fastest centralized algorithm. The next result simply follows from the
results for the payment scheme P (2) and from the fact that MRST is (1+ , )-smooth:
Theorem 28. If the type sets are upper-bounded then, for any , there exists a polynomial-time (1 + )-approximate truthful
mechanism with verificationM for the non-utilitarian MRST problem. Moreover,M is computable in O(mn+ n2 log n) time and
O(n2) space andM satisfies voluntary participation.
Since we can model5 the agents of this game as KSM bidders (see [15]) we have that, for any agent, there exists a critical
(valuation) value vC . If the bid on agent e has an associated valuation greater than vC then e is in the solution, while for
valuations less than vC agent e is out of game. Thus, modeling the agents as KSM bidders, we have that such a finite6 value
4 The valuation of agent i, for the solution X , is −costi(X, ti). This implies defining the profit (for a given solution X) as the received payment plus the
valuation for that solution.
5 Indeed, here the valuation can be defined as follows:−te if e is in the solution, 0 otherwise. Recall that the weight of agent e, for a given tree, is 1 when
e is in the tree and 0 otherwise. See [3] for more details.
6 Since no agent is indispensable then the graph is 2-connected. Thus, there is no agent included in the solution no matter what she declares, i.e., vC is
finite. See also [20].
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Table 2
The price of trust for several binary demand
games studied in literature. With n we denote
the number of nodes of the graph in input to
MRST and MDST problems, while ρ7 and ρ8
denote the running time of Algorithm 7 and
Algorithm 8 in [13]. Recall that α(·, ·) is the
classic inverse of the Ackermann’s function.
Problem Price of trust
MRST [20] O(n)
MDST [18] O(nα(n, n))
Set Cover [13] O(ρ7)
Link Weighted Steiner Tree [13] O(ρ8)
exists and as it upper-bounds the types (used in any solution)we could use it to dealwith unbounded instances (by removing
the hypothesis of bounded types). The problem is in computing these values. Actually, the authors of [20] need to compute
them, paying a linear factor in the time complexity of the entire mechanism. However, we can use, as an upper-bound for
the types, weights encoding useless (or non-existing) links (e.g., in the modern high bandwidth Internet, links slower than
56-kbps are out of date).
Binary demand games. The MRST problem we analyzed above is a special case of binary demand games (see, e.g., [13]).
This is a class of games in which every agent has two possible outcomes: being selected or not being selected. For such a
class of games, monotone algorithms correspond to weakly-monotone ones and therefore we can use the efficiency of our
payment schemes to improve existing truthful mechanisms. In particular, we define the Price of Trust (PoT)which measures
the price one has to pay to award payments before the execution of the work, thus ‘‘trusting’’ agents’ declarations. PoT
is defined as the ratio between the best (known) running time of a truthful mechanism without verification and the best
(known) running time of a truthful mechanism with verification. Since from any mechanisms without verification (A, P)
we can obtain a mechanism with verification using A and our payment schemes, in the PoT definition we don’t care about
approximation guarantee of the mechanisms. Indeed, their approximation guarantee can differ for at most a small factor
 > 0 (if mechanism with verification uses our payment scheme P (2) for smooth problems).
Several problems belonging to the class of binary demand games have been studied in literature: MRST we discussed
above, minimum diameter spanning tree [18], set cover and link weighted Steiner tree [13]. Table 2 summarizes the PoT for
these problems. We stress that all the best (known) truthful mechanisms with verification use the same algorithm of the
classical mechanisms but they use our payment schemes. For the first two rows we also remark that the the running time of
mechanisms with verification matches the one of the best non-strategic algorithm (a non-strategic algorithm is a classical
algorithm knowing all the input). Notice that by means of our payment schemes, truthful mechanisms with verification
gain at least a linear factor with respect to the classical ones (Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 8 in [13] are the algorithms used to
solve the corresponding problems). These results suggest that, in order to obtain payments leading to truthful mechanisms
without verification, one has at least to read the input of the problem at hand.
5. Conclusions and open problems
We propose new payment schemes for mechanisms with verification. Our results show that weak-monotonicity suffices
in more general settings w.r.t. the ones proposed in [5]. Indeed, using weakly-monotone algorithms, we are able to obtain
truthful mechanisms with verification for problems in which the types are discrete and upper-bounded. Moreover, weak-
monotonicity also suffices in the case in which types are continuous (but upper-bounded). Recall that in [5], it was showed
that weak-monotonicity suffices just for finite type sets. Our main contribution is in finding a constant-time computable
payment function which, in some sense, strengthen the notion of power of verification introduced in [5]. Indeed, we stress
the following important points.
Easier payments. Our payments are easy to understand and more importantly to compute: they just need the reading
of the input and one computes the payment of an agent in one step. This reduces the problem of finding a
truthful mechanismwith verification to the problem of designing a weakly-monotone algorithm. On the contrary,
designing truthful mechanism (without verification) one has to design a monotone algorithm (in general a harder
task than designing a weakly-monotone algorithm) and has to use the payments of [7]. The core is that these
payments may be difficulty to compute. Then, much work is needed in showing that the payments are actually
computable in polynomial-time.
Preserving algorithms. As we have seen for the MRST (and binary demand games in general) computing payments for
truthfulmechanisms can alsomakeworse time (and space) complexity of the algorithmic part. Since our payments
are constant-time computable we are able to preserve the running time of the algorithm used by a mechanism
with verification. Moreover, since a monotone algorithm is weakly-monotone as well, one can also reconsider all
existingmechanisms in order to improve their performances (aswe have done for theMRST problem). In a truthful
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mechanismwith verification we are able to preserve, not only the running time of the used algorithm, but also the
approximation guarantee of it in many real-life applications.
As we have seen the hypothesis of upper-bounded types can be overcome in natural problems. Nevertheless, it would
be interesting finding a payment scheme leading to truthful mechanisms with verification for continuous types (removing
the hypothesis of upper-bounded types). Moreover, for mechanisms with verification, it seems there is a trade-off between
cheapness and efficiency of the payment schemes. Indeed, the payments introduced in [5] are very cheap (in some sense
they are optimal) but not efficient. On the other hand, our payments are efficient but very expensive. Is there a relationship?
It would be nice to have an answer to this question.
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